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Introduction: Guantánamo, History, and
Responsibility
Alan Sussman ∗
A year ago an article appearing in the New Yorker magazine described the courage of Alberto Mora, a Navy lawyer who warned his
superiors at Guantánamo Bay about the abusive treatment of prisoners. The article was written by Jane Mayer, one of the participants in
the Seton Hall University School of Law’s Guantánamo Teach-In’s
panel of journalists. At the conclusion of her essay, Mayer quoted
Mora expressing his dismay at Bush Administration lawyers who
seemed to be unaware of history: “I wondered if they were even familiar with the Nuremberg trials—or with the laws of war, or with the
1
Geneva Conventions.”
It is difficult to know just what the lawyers and their clients in the
White House and the Departments of Defense knew about these matters, but Nuremberg seems a reasonable enough place to begin thinking about the issues which Guantánamo raises.
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal (“IMT” or
“Tribunal”) at Nuremberg set the modern standard of international
criminal responsibility in wartime, though it hardly wrote on a blank
slate. The Nuremberg judgment—indeed, the Tribunal itself—was
criticized for establishing categories of criminal behavior which had
2
no prior international standing, including crimes against humanity.
But its reliance on crimes of war and crimes against the peace (aggressive war) were firmly grounded in norms of international law
contained in treaties to which most states, including Germany, were
historically bound. The judgment of the IMT refers repeatedly to
principles and agreements located in pre-war treaties including the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
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1928, the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of Prisoners of War
of 1929, and others.
Since Nuremberg, of course, the number of international treaties addressing crimes of war has grown by a considerable degree, as
has the number of state parties bound to their standards. And general acceptance of the need for transnational rules of warfare has developed such that hesitations about the legitimacy of the Nuremberg
project may now be considered academic. But there is value in
briefly reviewing the Nuremberg principles, with specific regard to
international treaty obligations and the treatment of prisoners, as we
begin to read a compelling series of addresses and discussions of international law and the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo. The
value for Americans, I suggest, lies in an understanding that while all
four occupying powers (United States, France, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union) were equal members in the Nuremberg project, it was
3
largely due to American insistence that the IMT was established.
The London Agreement of 1945 and the subsequent charter
which created the structure and procedure of the Nuremberg trials
are primarily legal documents, setting forth matters of jurisdictional
reach, due process for defendants, and so on. But Nuremberg was
more than a legal proceeding, and no one involved thought otherwise. A terrible war had just been concluded which claimed the lives
of millions of combatants and millions more civilians. Reports of inconceivably barbaric treatment of Jews, other minorities, and prisoners by the Third Reich were beginning to surface. Memories of ambivalence or unwillingness of the victors of World War I—especially
Americans—to prosecute war criminals at the Great War’s end bur4
dened the Allies’ minds. A legal proceeding was called for, certainly,
but more necessarily, a statement had to be made which transcended
the boundaries of law.
This was to be accomplished in two ways. First, the statement
had to have international, if not universal, appeal. It had to speak
3
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not just to the emotions of the victors but to the sentiment of justice
5
of all mankind. And second, to escape the taint of “victors’ justice,”
those who sat in judgment had to proclaim their willingness to be
bound by the principles of the decision in the future.
It was Justice Jackson, serving as Chief United States Prosecutor
to the Tribunal, who promised to fulfill both aspirations. On leave
from the Supreme Court of the United States by request of President
Truman, his opening argument is memorable not only for its rhetorical brilliance but also for its strong moral tone. Upon reading it
more than half of a century later, one senses his attempt to draw a
line, not in the sand, but in the chronology of mankind itself. From
the date of this trial, he seems to say, there will be allowed no further
impunity for outrages upon humanity, even if sanctioned by state law.
From the date of this trial, he proceeds, we will constantly be called
upon as individuals and nations to place ourselves on one side of history or the other: there, in the past, with the men in the dock, on the
side of lawlessness and tyranny; or here, on the side of civilized behavior, which will be recognized henceforth by the principles the Tribunal is being urged to impose. In fact, Justice Jackson refers to the
word “civilized” or “civilization” in his opening statement no less than
fourteen times. For example:
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so
calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot stand their being repeated.
...
The real complaining party at your bar is Civilization . . . Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal
with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order of impor6
tance . . . .

In the same speech, Justice Jackson was no less emphatic about
the prosecuting nations’ obligation to the future. In this remarkable
passage, Justice Jackson distinguishes justice from vengeance, and in
doing so recognizes that the former implies a duty:

5
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[I]t is hard to distinguish between the demands for a just and
measured retribution and the unthinking cry for vengeance
which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, so far as humanely possible, to draw a line between the two. We must never
forget that the record on which we judge these defendants today
is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass
these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as
7
well.

The Tribunal’s final judgment, as we know, resulted in findings
of guilt and the imposition of severe sentences for most of the surviving major Nazi officials. But the judgment was not based on evidence
of mere evil-doing; it was based on the conclusion that the defendants violated the letter and norms of international law. The IMT
was most scornful of Germany’s transparent desire to be free of international treaty obligations in general, and those which required
the humane treatment of prisoners of war in particular. The judgment referred, for example, to a regulation of the German High
Command, issued shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union. It
deemed Russian soldiers undeserving of protection under the 1929
Geneva Convention because the U.S.S.R. never ratified it (though
Germany had), and because “Bolshevist” soldiers were not to be
trusted. The regulation stated:
Bolshevism is the deadly enemy of Nazi Germany . . . . The fight
against National-Socialism has become part of [the bolshevist soldier’s] system. He conducts it by every means in his power: Sabotage, seditious propaganda, incendiarism, murder. The bolshevist
soldier has therefore lost all claim to treatment as an honourable
8
opponent, in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The pretext of the decree was that since the enemy soldier was
untrustworthy (has any enemy been deemed otherwise?), he was unworthy of the very respect to which all captured soldiers are entitled
by international law. The decree was criticized almost at once by
Wilhelm Canaris, a German admiral, who was struck by its faulty logic
and permission for cruelty (Canaris later divorced himself from the
Nazi enterprise and was implicated in an unsuccessful attempt to
overthrow Hitler). Canaris argued that whether or not Russia signed
the Geneva accords, general principles of international law have long
7
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required the humane treatment of prisoners of war, and there was no
9
compelling reason for Germany to act otherwise. But Canaris’s objection failed to carry the day. A week later, a reply to Canaris was
written by Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German Armed Forces. Keitel
answered Canaris’s objection with a chilling syllogism:
The objections rise from the military concept of chivalrous warfare. This [war] is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I
10
approve and back the measures.

The Tribunal had no tolerance for such thinking. Geneva was
not about chivalry, and all wars are expressed in terms of ideology.
Keitel was later sentenced to death by the IMT for commission of war
crimes. In justifying its decision, not only against Keitel but other defendants as well, the IMT repeatedly condemned the Nazis’ hollow
defense of its abrogation of international law. The judgment states:
Everything [was] made subordinate to the overmastering dictates
of war. Rules, regulations, assurances, and treaties all alike [were]
of no moment; and so, freed from the restraining influence of international law, . . . War Crimes were committed when and wherever the Fuhrer and his close associates thought them to be ad11
vantageous.

This much is commonly understood. What is less well-known is
that a subsequent series of trials was also held at Nuremberg in which
less notorious Nazi officials and those who collaborated with them
were prosecuted pursuant to Council Control Law No. 10. (“C.C. Law
12
10”). This law was created at the same time as the charter for the
IMT, by the same four nations, and for the same purpose, but the trials it authorized were to be conducted by each nation in its own zone
of German occupation. It thus fell to the French, British, Soviet, and
American occupying forces to select who was to be prosecuted and
judged by each nation. These “successor” trials, which occurred from
1946 to 1949, are of interest to us today because the trials in the
American sector constituted a wholly American endeavor. The
United States could have decided to prosecute no one, but instead
selected an array of individuals whose culpability was more complex
than, say, Göring or Speer. They were not architects of evil designs
but persons without whose cooperation the designs could not have

9
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been fulfilled. Eighty-six individuals were prosecuted by the Americans pursuant to C.C. Law 10, including judges, lawyers, military commanders, doctors, cabinet ministers, industrialists (from Krupp and
I.G. Farben), and death squad commandos. Fifteen were sentenced
14
to death and nineteen to life in prison. No one can say of the successor trials that the United States went along for the international
ride.
Like the trials of the major war criminals by the IMT, the American trials held under authority of C.C. Law 10 paid close attention to
German abrogation or dismissal of pre-war international treaties and
violation of humane standards for the treatment of prisoners. For
15
example, in United States v. Krupp, the court authorized by C.C. Law
10 referred to a decree of the Reich which swiftly dispatched the requirements of Hague Convention. The decree read:
The regulations of the Hague Convention on Land Warfare which
concern the administration of a country occupied by a foreign
belligerent power are not applicable, since the U.S.S.R. is to be
considered dissolved, and therefore the Reich has the obligation
of exercising all governmental and other sovereign functions in
the interest of the country’s inhabitants. Therefore, any measures
are permitted which the German administration decrees neces16
sary and suitable for the execution of this comprehensive plan.

Note: the defeated nation is no longer a nation, “therefore, any
17
measures are permitted.” According to one of the American judges
who sat in judgment on the Krupp case, “this policy, that the Hague
Conventions were not applicable at all in Russia, was openly proclaimed and there was no attempt to keep it secret not to comply with
18
the requirements of international law.”

13

Telford Taylor, Chief Prosecutor for the United States in these trials, states:
“The responsibility for the selection of defendants in the Nuernberg Trials under
Law No. 10 was mine alone . . . . No one has been indicted . . . unless, in my judgment, there appeared to be substantial evidence of criminal conduct under accepted
principles of international penal law.” Id. at 85.
14
FRANK BUSHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946–1955
175–78 (1989). Some of the non-death sentences were reduced in 1951. Id.
15
9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, THE KRUPP CASE (1951).
16
Id. at 1471.
17
Id.
18
Id. (Wilkins, J., dissenting). The dissent was from the acquittal of the defendants of the charge of spoliation in occupied territories, not from the finding of guilt
of the more severe charges of crimes against the peace and the use of slave and concentration camp labor. Id.
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The most interesting of the C.C. Law 10 cases, in light of the
Teach-In on Guantánamo, is what is called the Justice Case, in which
fourteen former German judges and prosecutors were charged with
violations of the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Prisoner of
War Convention of 1929 and, as stated in the indictment, “the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law derived
from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, [and] the internal pe19
nal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed.”
The Justice Case could have proved to be a delicate endeavor:
20
judges judging judges; laws trumping laws. But the court did not
have to engage in esoteric interpretations or legal quibbling. The
Nazi decrees created or enforced by the defendants were patently unjust. Consider the “Night and Fog” (Nacht und Nebel) decree, examined in the Justice Case. (The decree has some relevance to the procedures discussed at the Teach-In. The detainees at Guantanamo
were seized under dubious circumstances, sometimes betrayed or
sold for bounty, flown across a continent and ocean, held incommunicado, without access to friends or relatives or witnesses, and “tried”
in Cuba by their captors with secret evidence and no assistance of
counsel.) The indictment in the Justice Case charged the defendants
with participating in the execution of Nacht und Nebel project,
whereby civilians of occupied territories who had been accused of
crimes of resistance against occupying forces were spirited away
for secret trial by certain Special Courts of the Justice Ministry
within the Reich, in the course of which the victims’ whereabouts,
trial, and subsequent disposition were kept completely secret,
thus serving the dual purpose of terrorizing the victims’ relatives
and associates and barring recourse to any evidence, witnesses, or
counsel for defense. The accused was not informed of the disposition of his case, and in almost every instance those who were acquitted or who had served their sentences were handed over by
the Justice Ministry to the Gestapo for “protective custody” for the
21
duration of the war.

The American Tribunal found ten of the fourteen defendants
guilty. The tribunal held that “[a]ll . . . who took part in enforcing or
carrying it out knew that its enforcement violated international law of
19

3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, THE JUSTICE CASE 22–23 (1951) [hereinafter THE
JUSTICE CASE].
20
See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958) (debating whether or not Nazi law was “law”).
21
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war. They also knew, which was evident from the language of the de22
cree, that it was a hard, cruel, and inhumane plan . . . .”
This review of events which occurred in the 1940s in Europe has
taken a long detour in time and space from Guantánamo Bay. But
we could do worse than study this history, and ask if we have forgotten what Justice Jackson said we must never forget: that the record on
which we judge the Nuremberg defendants today is the record on
which history will judge us tomorrow. We could ask if we have poisoned the chalice which he swore we were bound by justice to raise to
our own lips.
It was my pleasure to have participated in the organization of
this Teach-In, the genealogy of which takes us back to an earlier war,
which also aroused questions of law and human decency. So it is
good that this program is being broadcast to hundreds of colleges,
seminaries, and law schools, as our nation’s future depends upon
those who ask hard questions.

22

Id. at 1038.

